




Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the
eects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present
paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the
equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well
as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional
representation. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the
number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specic to the ex-
porting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specic
input employed by the import-competing sector. It is further argued
that political rents are lower (higher) under majoritarian elections if
there are more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the
exporting (import-competing) industry.
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There is a large consensus in the literature that trade policy is determined by
the interaction of politicians, interest groups, and voters. Given this view,
why are some countries more protectionist than others? Political science links
policy choices to fundamental constitutional features such as, for example,
the electoral rule employed. Can this institutional arrangement provide an
explanation for the cross-country variation in trade politics? If so, the con-
stitutional design is of economic importance for newly emerging democracies,
but also for more consolidated democratic regimes seeking to change their
election scheme.1 Unfortunately, evidence from recent research is conicting
and inconclusive regarding which type of electoral system produces the most
protectionist policy. The primary aim of the current paper is to solve this
ambiguity.
While the specic question of how constitutional rules inuence trade pol-
icy has been neglected until recently, much of the work on comparative po-
litical economy studies aspects of scal policy. Persson and Tabellini (1999),
for example, relate the size and composition of government spending to the
political system. In a Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-
looking voting it is shown that majoritarian, as opposed to proportional,
elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key
marginal (swing) districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for
politicians, more redistribution and larger government.
The analysis has its trade policy counterpart in a theoretical and empiri-
cal study by Roelfsema (2004), who argues that countries with a majoritarian
electoral system are more inclined to have a high level of trade protection.
The reason is a higher competition intensity for swing districts compared
to countries with proportional representation. Following this view, Persson
(2005) makes the case that since proportional democracies seek consensus
1Recently, Italy replaced its system of proportional representation, where legislators
were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their
parties, with one that includes ingredients of plurality rule, where legislators are elected
in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes. A number of other
countries have implemented related reforms. For instance, after the referendum of 1993,
New Zealand altered its system of plurality rule in single-member districts to a system
mixing elements of proportional representation. In France, the Socialist Party switched
from the two-round majority system to PR for the 1986 elections. Japan moved to a
system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation from its special
form of plurality rule. The UK has debated similar proposals.
2among broader coalitions of voters, they should have relatively less protec-
tionist trade policies. Moreover, if proportional representation leads to the
election of legislators who maximize aggregate welfare, because their election
is not tied to particular geographic or economic interests, then the model
of Grossman and Helpman (2005) predicts higher average rates of protec-
tion in countries with majoritarian elections. Willman (2008) comes to the
same conclusion using a citizen-candidate model with majoritarian voting
and strategic delegation. In this setting, the median voter of a typical elec-
toral district ignores the negative externality of protection imposed on other
constituencies by electing delegates to a national legislature who represent
the interests of those who own more than the district average amount of
sector-specic capital. The extent of strategic delegation, and the ensuing
level of protection, is shown to be increasing in the number of districts, which
is relatively lower under the proportional system.
Hateld and Hauk (2004), on the other hand, obtain the opposite result,
that proportional systems have higher average taris than majoritarian insti-
tutions. In their model this is due to the proportional legislature weighting
each domestic industry by its share of workers in the tari formation process,
while under the majoritarian electoral rule, the winning coalition of sectors
does not consider the consequences of not raising the taris on the industries
not included in the coalition, thus leading to lower overall taris.
The present paper shows that both these policy outcomes are possible
by incorporating an export industry, producing for foreign markets using a
sector-specic factor, into a model of endogenous trade policy with proba-
bilistic voting (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).2 A given fraction of the pop-
ulation owns this specic input, and consequently has a direct stake in the
exporting industry. The remaining individuals are the owners of a specic
factor used by an import-competing sector, and therefore have a common
interest in this sector. Within this framework, it is argued that trade policy
is more (less) restrictive (i.e., characterized by more import protection and
higher export taxation or less export subsidies) under proportional electoral
regimes, as compared to majoritarian institutions, if marginal districts are
populated by relatively more (less) factor owners with stakes in the export-
ing industry. This result is explained by a stier electoral competition in the
majoritarian system, where politicians focus relatively more on the type of
2Roelfsema (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2005), and Hateld and Hauk (2004) also
apply the probabilistic voting model outlined in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
3factor owners who represent the largest fraction of the voting population in
the swing districts. The election outcome is more sensitive to policy, and
therefore the more dominant, or decisive, type obtains a trade policy closer
to its bliss point as compared to proportional representation. This in turn
implies a relatively higher (lower) level of protection under the proportional
electoral rule.3
The paper also has implications for electoral competition and rent seek-
ing in a small open economy. Persson and Tabellini (1999) argue that since
the electoral competition is stier under the majoritarian electoral rule, par-
ties become relatively more disciplined and forego some prospective political
rents. This seems to suggest that less consolidated democracies, associated
with pervasive rent seeking, optimally should apply the proportional system
to maximize rent-seeking income. However, Norris (2008) nds that countries
using proportional representation consistently rate as the most democratic,
where rent seeking is low, while majoritarian systems proved consistently
less democratic. Within the current framework it is shown that majoritarian
elections make politicians forego rents at a higher (lower) rate compared to
the proportional system if and only if there are relatively more factor owners
in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import-competing) sector.
The reason is that higher rents translate into a more protectionist trade pol-
icy, which creates a negative externality on the voters who own claims to the
specic input used in the exporting industry. The majoritarian regime pro-
motes a more intense political competition that to a relatively larger extent
internalizes the policy preferences of the type of factor owners who belong to
the dominant fraction of the voting population in the districts with the least
ideological bias. When there are relatively more factor owners with stakes in
the exporting (import-competing) sector in these districts, it becomes polit-
ically optimal to apply a relatively lower (higher) level of rent seeking under
majoritarian elections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expands
3It is assumed that trade policy can be set with some degree of national discretion.
However, the main results still hold if politics are constrained by trading arrangements,
given the view that the domestic political environment restricts the actions that govern-
ments take in international economic negotiations. Also it should be noted that under the
World Trade Organization, the applied taris (that is, the level of protection below the
ocial rates legally committed to) change frequently depending on the supply, demand,
and political situation in each specic country (United States Department of Agriculture,
2004).
4on the economic framework, while Section 3 introduces the political economy
dimension, solves for the trade policy and equilibrium rents in a proportional
and majoritarian electoral regime, and provides a comparative analysis. Con-
cluding comments are made in the closing section.
2 Economic Framework
The economic setting is a modication of the model of Grossman and Help-
man (1994).
2.1 Consumption and Production
Consider a small open economy consisting of three rms: an exporting rm
(X), an import-competing rm (M), and a rm (Z) producing a numeraire
good.4 The numeraire product uses labor alone with constant returns to
scale. By assumption, aggregate labor supply is suciently large to ensure
a positive output of this good. Units are chosen such that the wage paid to
labor is one. Both nonnumeraire industries produce, with constant returns
to scale technology, a good using labor and a sector-specic input supplied
inelastically. The exporting industry sends its entire output to some foreign
markets, while the import-competing sector produces solely for the domestic
market in competition with foreign suppliers.5
The economy is populated by individuals with identical preferences but
dierent factor endowments. Following Chang et al. (2009) in their applica-
tion of the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), each agent maximizes
a utility function of the form:
U = xZ + u(x): (2.1)
xZ represents consumption of the numeraire good, where the corresponding
world and domestic price are equal to one. x = yC +mC stands for consump-
tion of the homogenous products y and m supplied to the domestic market,
4The model can be generalized to allow for many rms in each sector.
5This assumption is made for simplicity. All results generalize if the exporting (import-
competing) sector sells a majority of its production to the foreign markets (domestic
market).
5where y is the total amount of the commodity manufactured by the import-
competing sector, and m is aggregate imports.6 Denote by pw the exogenous
and common world price of these goods, while p = pw + t represents the do-
mestic price, where t stands for the specic tari, or import subsidy, levied
on imports. The subutility function u(x) possesses the standard properties
of dierentiability and strict concavity, and leads to a demand function of
the form: x = d(p) = (u0(x))
 1. The consumer devotes the remainder of
his total spending of E to the numeraire good, thereby attaining the utility
level:
(p;E) = E + s(p); (2.2)
where s(p)  u(d(p)) pd(p) is the consumer surplus per capita derived from
imported goods and domestically produced import-competing commodities.
Let (p) denote the aggregate domestic rent accruing to the specic factor
used in producing the import-competing good. Similarly, let  (p) stand
for the domestic aggregate reward to the specic factor used in producing the
exporting good, where p = p
w + e is the domestic price of exports. p
w and
e represent, respectively, the corresponding world price and specic export
subsidy, or export tax, imposed on domestic exporters.
If the world price, pw (p
w), is normalized to unity, the domestic price of
an import-competing (exporting) good is: p = 1 + t (p = 1 + e). Hence,
a price p (p) in excess of one implies an import tari (export subsidy),
t > 0 (e > 0), on foreign (domestic) exports. A price below unity corre-
sponds to import subsidies (export taxes), t < 0 (e < 0), on foreign (domes-
tic) export products.7 Using Hotelling's lemma gives the supply curve for
the domestic import-competing (exporting) commodity: 0(t) = y(t)  0
(0 (e) = y (e)  0).
A typical individual owns one unit of labor and derives income from
wages, either by working in the exporting, import-competing or the nu-
meraire industry; from government transfers in the form of tari revenues,
net of the cost of export subsidies, redistributed uniformly to the public; and
from the ownership of some domestic sector-specic factor. By assumption,
6The analysis can be extended to allow for product dierentiation.
7The foreign tari or import subsidy levied on domestic exports, and the export subsidy
or export tax imposed on foreign exporters by foreign governments have been suppressed
in the expressions for p and p for notational convenience and with no loss of generality.
The aim of this paper is to solve for the equilibrium trade policy of one country under
dierent electoral rules.
6claims to these specic inputs are indivisible and nontradable, and the rep-
resentative individual owns at most one type. Thus, those who own some of
the specic input employed in a particular industry will have a direct stake
in the tax or subsidy applicable to trade in the good produced by the sector
in question that goes beyond their general interest as consumers.
This concludes the description of the economic model. The next section
introduces the policy formation process under proportional and majoritarian
elections.
3 Political Framework
The political setting considered is a modication of the model by Persson and
Tabellini (1999), which in turn is based on the probabilistic voting approach
adapted by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
3.1 The Basic Setting
Assume that elections involve the set of candidates, or parties, fA;Bg, which
is xed and nite; candidates strive to maximize their vote share or, alter-
natively, their probability of winning; candidates simultaneously choose the
policy vector =(t;e); having observed the candidates' platforms, voters de-
cide which candidate to vote for, and voting is costless. In addition, the
candidates' commitments to their announced trade policy platforms, ahead
of the elections, are assumed to be binding.
Besides , the parties may dier in some other dimension unrelated to
policy. This dimension is referred to as ideology, but it could also involve
other attributes such as the personal characteristics of the party leadership.
The ideological dimension is a permanent feature in that it cannot credibly
be modied as part of the electoral platform. Furthermore, by assumption,
voters dier in their evaluation of these features.
The population consists of citizens belonging to dierent electoral dis-
tricts indexed, in the same way as industries, by j = M;X;Z (a citizen
of district j is interchangeably referred to as a member of voter group j),
where the population size of each district is dened by a continuum of voters
with unit mass. Consider then the following two simplifying assumptions:
the three electoral districts coincide with the three sectors in the economy;8
8This approach is similar to the one taken by Willmann (2008). It can be shown that
7constituents in district X and M own the factor specic to that particular
industry, while a fraction X (1   X = M) of the voting population in dis-
trict Z owns the specic input used by the exporting (import-competing)
sector.9 Accordingly, to highlight the geographical concentration of indus-
tries, the three dierent sectors of the current specic factors model are
associated with electoral districts, populated by individuals with stakes in
either the exporting or the import-competing industry.
At the time of the elections, voters base their voting decision both on the
trade policy announcements and on the two candidates' ideologies. Speci-









+ ij + : (3.1)
ij is an individual-specic parameter that can take on negative as well as
positive values. It measures the individual ideological bias of voter i towards
candidate B. A positive value of ij implies that voter i has a bias in favor
of party B, whereas voters with ij = 0 are ideologically neutral, i.e., they




2j6=Z +  j6=Z; 1
2j6=Z +  j6=Z
i
in voter group j 6=
Z, where  j6=Z denotes the average ideology, and j6=Z is the density of the
distributions, which captures the voters' responsiveness to policy.10
Since income inequality in the electorate is derived from dierences in
input ownership, those in group X (M) have the same marginal probabilistic
response to income, and welfare WX (WM), as the agents belonging to the
fraction X (M) of voter group Z. That is, voters with the same factor
endowment are equally responsive to policy from the perspective of both
all results generalize if districts and sectors do not completely overlap, provided that there
are relatively more exporting (import-competing) rms located in district X (M). (See,
for example, Persson and Tabellini [2002] for an application on public good provision.)
Moreover, geographic concentration is widely used as a proxy for political concentration
(i.e., the spread of industry across political districts). Busch and Reinhardt (1999) provide
an overview of the literature on this topic.
9This assumption is made for simplicity. All results still hold if constituents with
a common interest in the exporting (import-competing) industry own some, but not a
majority, of the endowment of the specic factor used in the import-competing (exporting)
sector.
10As Persson and Tabellini (2002) point out, the properties of the equilibrium do not
change in a qualitative substantial way for more general distributions of voters' ideological
preferences, namely if the group distributions of the parameter ij are not uniform, but
unimodal.
8parties.11 Hence, the distribution of individual ideology in group Z, iZ,
diers across the two types of factor owners in the following way: iZX  h
  1
2X +  X; 1





2M +  M; 1
2M +  M
i
.12 Thus two
parameters,  j6=Z and j6=Z, fully characterize the distributions. Specically,
factor owners dier in their average ideology, captured by the means,  j6=Z,
and in their ideological homogeneity, a higher density, j6=Z, being associated
with a narrower distribution of ij. Hence, j6=Z measures the height of the
distributions, and how many voters are gained among factor owners with a
stake in sector j 6= Z per marginal increase in their economic welfare.
The parameter , which captures the average (relative) popularity of can-







. As seen below,  generates the required
uncertainty about the election outcome.
The timing of the political process is as follows. (1) The two candidates,
simultaneously and noncooperatively, announce their trade policy:  A and
 B. At this stage, they know the voters' policy preferences. They also know
the distributions of ij and , but not yet their realized values. (2) The
actual value of  is realized and all uncertainty is resolved. (3) Elections are
held. (4) The elected candidate implements the announced policy platform.
To formally study the candidates' decisions at Stage 2, the swing voter
in group j is identied; that is, a voter whose ideological bias, given the










where all voters i in group j with ij  j prefer party A. Hence, given the
distributional assumptions, the actual vote share of candidate A in group j
is:
$A; j = j






11Econometric studies (using micro-level survey data) on individual trade policy pref-
erences by Balistreri (1997), Beaulieu (2002), Scheve and Slaughter (2001) nd that the
type of factor ownership has been the dominant determinant of support for, or opposition
to, trade barriers for both Canada and the U.S.
12This implies that Z and Z can be expressed as the weighted mean of the correspond-
ing ideological parameters of the two types of factor owners belonging to the numeraire
district: Z =
P
j6=Z jZj and Z =
P
j6=Z jj.
9Since j depends on the realized value of , the vote share is also a random
variable. From both candidates' perspective, the electoral outcome is thus a
random event, related to the realization of .
3.2 Proportional Elections
Consider trade policy under an electoral rule where it is equally important to
win votes in all voter groups. By assumption, there is perfect proportional
representation in the sense that the parties obtain a seat share in perfect
proportion to their vote share in the entire population. Furthermore, the
party which obtains more than fty percent of the seats earns the right to
set policy according to its political platform.13 Under this electoral rule the












Without loss of generality, assume that
P
j j j = 0. Given (3.2), the

























3 is the average density across groups, and ZWZ 
P
j6=Z jjWj.14
The welfare associated with candidate A of a representative owner of the
specic factor used in industry M and X is:
13For countries with proportional systems, more than two parties are usually observed.
It should be noted, though, that the theory of probabilistic voting can be extended to
multiparty elections|that is, elections involving three or more parties. For example,
Dorussen et al. (1997) show that when the random component of voter decision making
is suciently large, the so-called \minimum-sum point," which minimizes the average
distance between voters and the parties' positions, represents a convergent equilibrium.
This generalizes the results for two-party competition to the multiparty setting. The
current assumption of two political candidates is accordingly made for simplicity. However,
very commonly, parties sort themselves out before the elections into two party coalitions,
each of which is vying for a majority of the electorate. See for example Petterson-Lidbom
(2008) who characterizes the Swedish multiparty proportional system as bipartisan.
14ZWZ can thus be interpreted as the weighted social welfare function of group Z. The
denition implies that both parties internalize the number of voters in district Z with a




































where l = 1 stands for the labor supply (and also labor income from working
in the exporting, import-competing or the numeraire sector) of an owner of









1+X denote the per capita rent accruing to the specic factor used in

















A unique equilibrium exists in which both A and B choose the same .
Formally, they share the same rst-order conditions, and do not themselves
have preferences over policy. It follows from (3.5) that the equilibrium vector
is a weighted mean of the two types of factor owners' individually optimal
policy choices. The weights correspond to the total number of voters with
stakes in industry j6=Z, i.e., 1+j6=Z, but also to the densities of swing voters
among the factor owners, j6=Z, since the densities summarize how responsive
the dierent factor owners are to trade policy; that is, how they reward policy
with votes at the elections.
To characterize the equilibrium t under a proportional electoral system,







(1 + X)(M   X)



























































3 . Substituting these expressions into the rst-order condition






(1 + M)(X   M)





It is optimal for the two parties to equate the marginal gain of votes to
the marginal loss of votes. The equilibrium therefore involves a supportive
trade policy towards the factor owners with the highest density, because they
are the most responsive voters. Hence, if M > X, foreign and domestic
exports are taxed, that is, tPRO  0 and ePRO  0. Intuitively, a tax on
imports increases the domestic price of the import-competing good, while
taxing exports decreases the domestic price of the exporting good. This in
turn increases the reward to the specic factor used in the import-competing
sector, and decreases the return to the specic input used in producing the
exporting good. The welfare cost of a higher price of imports, net of tax
revenues, is borne uniformly by both types of factor owners. Trade taxation
thus entail a negative externality on the individuals who own claims to the
specic input employed in the exporting sector, who are taxed as both factor
owners and consumers, and do not share in the benets of a more restrictive
trade policy.
On the other hand, if M < X, foreign and domestic exports are sub-
sidized, i.e., tPRO  0 and ePRO  0, which decreases the price of imports
and increases the domestic price of exports. This decreases the return to
the specic factor used in the import-competing industry, and increases the
reward to the specic input used by the exporting sector, while the benet
of a lower price on imports, net of the subsidy cost, accrues to both types of
factor owners. Hence, such a policy combination creates a negative external-
ity on the individuals with a stake in the import-competing industry, who as
consumers share in the overall benets to the economy of liberalized trade,
but in their capacity as factor owners incur welfare losses.
Thus, the politically optimal trade policy is an import and export tax
(subsidy) when the number of swing voters within the group of owners of the


































3 . Using these expressions in the rst-order condition for (3.5),
solving for the optimum e, and rearranging terms give (3.9).
12with a common interest in sector X. (It is more convenient to refer to the
number of voters instead of the density, even though the distributions of the
ideological parameters are assumed to be continuous.)
Also note that free trade prevails if M = X, which implies that tPRO =
ePRO = 0. In this case, the two types of factor owners neutralize one an-
other, so that the demand for trade taxation is matched in equilibrium by
preferences for subsidies.
3.3 Majoritarian Elections
What if elections are instead conducted under plurality rule in one-seat elec-
toral districts? First, assume that the candidate that obtains fty percent
or more of the vote in a district gains the seat in the legislature. Then add
the following winning rule: earning the right to set policy requires winning
at least two seats out of three. As Persson and Tabellini (1999) point out,
this setting can be interpreted as a parliamentary election in which two com-
peting parties eld candidates running on the same platform in all three
districts. The party winning in a majority of the districts has a majority in
the assembly and can thus implement its preannounced trade policy.
Following Persson and Tabellini (1999), let  X <  M, thus  X <  Z <  M
since Z =
P
j6=Z jZj, where  Z = 0 is assumed without loss of generality.
Suppose that this ideological bias towards party A in group X and towards
party B in group M are large enough so that the group-specic means,  X
and  M, are suciently distant from zero. Then there exists an equilibrium
with policy convergence, where the entire political competition takes place
in the marginal district, Z.17 Party A wins district X with a large enough
probability, and loses district M with a large enough probability so that
neither party nds it optimal to seek voters outside the marginal district,
since only two districts are required for winning the election. In this setting,
the relevant expression for the probability of candidate A winning is just the





























17Formally, the equilibrium requires restrictions on  j6=Z. See Persson and Tabellini
(1999) for a derivation of these restrictions in a public goods framework.
13where Z =
P
j6=Z jj is the average density across the types of factor
owners of district Z.18 Compared to (3.5), this expression clearly depends
only on what takes place in the marginal district.
Taking the derivative of (3.10) with respect to tA, solving for the equilib-
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X(1 + 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(XX(1 + M)   MM(1 + X))





Thus the government imposes a tax on foreign and domestic exports
(tMAJ  0 and eMAJ  0) given that M > X, where  
X(1+M)
M(1+X).19
The tax on imports raises the price of the import-competing good, while a
tax on exports decreases the domestic price of the exporting good. This in-
creases the reward to the specic factor used in the import-competing sector,
and decreases the return to the specic input used by the exporting sector,
whereas the welfare cost of a higher trade taxation is shared by all voters.
This policy combination therefore inicts a negative externality on those who
own claims to the specic input used in the exporting sector, which is not
18This implies that group Z, which on average is ideologically neutral, does not necessar-
ily have the highest number of ideologically neutral voters. However, the ideological bias,
given by the relation  X <  Z <  M, is assumed to be such that all electoral competition
still concentrates on the marginal district.
19This condition is principally the same as the one determining trade policy under
proportional institutions. Note that  = 1 when X = M, and  > 1 if X > M, but
 < 1 whenever X < M. This reects the fact that a higher (lower) taxation, under a
majoritarian electoral rule, requires more swing voters among those with a common interest
in the import-competing (exporting) sector in proportion to the share of individuals who
own the input employed by the exporting (import-competing) industry. The reason is
that, under a majoritarian system, the political power of the constituents in district Z,
with stakes in sector j6=Z, is relatively more dependent on the number of voters who own
the factor used by the industry in question (that is, the parameter j6=Z). This can be seen
from the specic structure of the candidates' goal functions, i.e., from (3.5) and (3.10).
14internalized by the voters with a common interest in the import-competing
industry.
If M < X, the government subsidizes foreign and domestic exports
(tMAJ  0 and eMAJ  0). This decreases the price of imports and increases
the domestic price of exports, which decreases the return to the specic
factor used in the production of the import-competing good, and increases
the reward to the specic input used in producing exports. The benet of
the lower price of imports, net of the subsidy cost, is shared by both types of
factor owners. This creates a negative externality on the voters with a stake
in the import-competing sector, who benet as consumers but loses in terms
of welfare as factor owners.
Whenever M = X free trade prevails, and tMAJ = eMAJ = 0.
The politically optimal trade-o between taxation and subsidies for elec-









y (ek)m0 (tk)(1 + M)
: (3.13)
(3.13) is non-positive since either tk  0 and ek  0 if M > X (or
M > X), or tk  0 and ek  0 if M < X (or M < X). Given




, is higher and the volume of domestic exports, y  
ek
, is lower,
voters with a stake in the import-competing sector have relatively more to
gain from a higher import tari than a higher export taxation. Intuitively,
a higher import tari solely benets these voters in their capacity as factor
owners, while the revenues from taxing exports are redistributed uniformly
to all voters. Moreover, a higher value of the derivative of the export supply
function, y0  
ek
, and a lower absolute value of the derivative of the import
demand function, m0  
tk
, imply that the deadweight loss from taxation of
exports is high, whereas the social cost of import taris is low. This increases
the benet of taxing domestic exports at a relatively lower rate, and imports
at a relatively higher rate.
If M < X (or M < X), when the output of the domestic export-
ing good, y  
ek




, is lower, voters with a stake in the exporting sector prefer a relatively
higher rate of subsidies on domestic exports than on imports. The reason is
that export subsidies increase the reward to the specic factor used in the
exporting industry, while the benet of a lower price on imports is shared by
15all voters. A higher absolute value of the derivative of the import demand
function, m0  
tk
, and a lower value of the derivative of the export supply
function, y0  
ek
, implies that the social value of import subsidies is low,
while the benet of export subsidies is high due to a low elasticity of domes-
tic export supply. This increases the welfare of subsidizing domestic exports
at a relatively higher rate and imports at a relatively lower rate.
3.4 Comparative Trade Policy
























It can be established that (see Appendix A.1 for details) tPRO > tMAJ
 
tPRO < tMAJ
if there are relatively more factor owners in district Z with
stakes in the exporting (import-competing) sector. When X > M (X < M)
it is optimal for both candidates in a convergent electoral equilibrium to pro-
pose a relatively lower (higher) level of protection under majoritarian elec-
tions. Such a trade policy has the same political benet to the parties as
under a proportional system, namely the marginal votes gained among own-
ers of the input used in the exporting (import-competing) sector, but the
costs are smaller, as the parties do not internalize the votes lost in the non-
marginal district M (X). The electoral competition is stier, because the
candidates are relatively more focused on the type of factor owners who rep-
resents the largest fraction of the voting population in the district with the
least average ideological bias. Since the election outcome is more sensitive
to policy, the dominant, and therefore decisive, type in district Z, X (M),
obtains a trade policy closer to its bliss point as compared to proportional
representation. This translates into a relatively less (more) protectionist
stance.
20It can be shown that this assumption is valid in the case of linear import functions with































It is shown in Appendix A.2 that ePRO > eMAJ  
ePRO < eMAJ
if there
are relatively more factor owners in district Z with stakes in the import-
competing (exporting) sector. If M > X (M < X), the parties gain by
announcing a less (more) supportive policy towards the export industry under
majoritarian elections. As already noted, the majoritarian regime promotes
a more intense political competition, which implies a trade policy that to a
larger extent internalizes the benets and costs of the voters that belong to
the dominant fraction M (X) of district Z. District Z is an asymmetric
replica of the entire population 8M 6= X, where the factor owners with a
stake in the import-competing (exporting) sector receive more weight. This
asymmetry has the same eect as increasing the number of swing voters
within the group of owners of the specic factor used by sector M (X) under
proportional elections, the result of which follows from (3.9)|less (more)
export subsidies or a higher (lower) export taxation.
These results conrm the ndings of Roelfsema (2004), Persson (2005),
Grossman and Helpman (2005), and Willman (2008), as well as those of
Hateld and Hauk (2004), because the equilibrium level of protection can be
comparatively lower, and higher, under the majoritarian electoral rule. The
policy outcome depends on the relative size of the fraction of constituents in
the marginal district with stakes in the exporting sector. Thus the framework
presented here encompasses as special cases the earlier models reported in
the literature.
Noting that PRO   MAJ =
3(X M)MX
(1+M)(MM+XX)(M(1+M)+X(1+X)), dif-
ferentiating this expression with respect to M and X, evaluating at M =
X gives:
22It can be shown that this assumption is valid in the case of linear export functions with
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The reason for these results can be explained as follows. By (3.5) and
(3.10), the parties internalize the ideological homogeneity, j6=Z, among the
factor owners to a relatively larger extent under proportional elections com-
pared with the majoritarian rule (by a factor of 1+j6=Z compared to j6=Z).
Under the majoritarian system, on the other hand, the political inuence
is relatively more dependent on the number of voters with stakes in sector
j 6= Z. Therefore, at free trade, where M = X, when the number of
swing voters increases among those with a stake in the import-competing
(exporting) sector, the level of protection under the proportional electoral


























As shown in Appendix A.4, it follows that:
@(ePRO   eMAJ)
M










Using the same line of reasoning as above, the political parties take into
account the level of ideological homogeneity relatively more under propor-
tional elections. Hence, at free trade, as the number of swing voters increases
among the agents with a stake in the import-competing (exporting) sector,
the level of export support distributed under the proportional electoral rule
decreases (increases) relative to the majoritarian case.
Up until now, there has been no conict of interest between voters and
their political representatives. In the following it is assumed that politicians
are rent seeking. How do the candidates exploit their political power to
appropriate resources for themselves at the voters' expense in a small open
economy and under dierent electoral rules? Can the voters discipline politi-
cians through the implicit incentives elections oer? Persson and Tabellini
(1999) argue that since the electoral competition is stier under the ma-
joritarian electoral rule, the parties become relatively more disciplined and
forego some prospective political rents. Does their result hold in the current
setting? These questions are addressed below.
3.5 Electoral Competition and Equilibrium Rents
To give an incentive for political rent seeking, suppose that the candidate
winning the election captures a share  2 (0;1) of the tari revenues; that
is, R = tm(t), where t  0 and R reects endogenous rents to politi-
cians|outright diversion of resources, such as corruption or party nancing.
Consider trade balance equilibrium, where the value of imports equals the
value of exports:  Hm(t) =  Fy(e), where  H = (tH;eF) denotes the vector
19of domestic trade policies aecting aggregate imports to the small open econ-
omy (i.e., the domestic tari, tH, and the foreign export subsidy or export
tax, eF, levied on domestic imports), and  F = (tF;eH) is the correspond-
ing vector of foreign policy instruments levied on domestic exports. Further,
assume symmetric trade policies, that is,  H =  F, such that m(t) = y(e),
which gives t = R
y(e).
The timing of the political process is the same as in Subsection 3.1. (1)
The two candidates, simultaneously and noncooperatively, announce their
policy: qA = (RA;eA) and qB = (RB;eB). Since  is a parameter and
t = R
y(e), this yields the domestic policy vector =(t;e). At this stage, the
parties know the voters' policy preferences. They also know the distribu-
tions of the ideology and popularity parameters, ij and , but not yet their
realized values. (2) The actual value of  is realized and all uncertainty is
resolved. (3) Elections are held. (4) The elected candidate implements the
announced policy platform.




Suppose for simplicity that in equilibrium, the trade tax revenues that
accrues to the voters are matched by the subsidies distributed to the domestic














3 .24 The welfare associated with candidate A of
a representative owner of the specic factor used in industry M and X can































24This assumption aects the equilibrium level of rents under the dierent electoral
rules, but not the relative level, since r
 
A
enters symmetrically into the candidates'
objective functions under both majoritarian and proportional elections. The focus of this







are dened analogously. Since both candi-
dates share the same rst-order conditions, a unique equilibrium exists in
which both A and B choose the same R.
Taking the rst-order condition of (3.24) for RA to obtain:
@PA
@RAR







where the second equality exploits that PA = 1
2, since RA = RB in equi-
librium. Using (3.25) and (3.26) in the derivative of (3.5) with respect to
RA, substituting the resulting expression in (3.27), to obtain the equilibrium
rents under proportional representation:
R












(3.29) is decreasing in  , the density of the distribution of the popular-
ity parameter . The uncertain outcome of the relative political popularity
means that the identity of the swing voters is not known. This creates elec-
toral uncertainty, which weakens the electoral competition, as a candidate's
probability of winning falls only at the nite rate   for a marginal increase
in rents. The lower is this rate, that is, the more uncertain is the election
outcome, the larger is the scope for seeking rents. Also, by dierentiating
(3.29) it can be shown that ~ RPRO is increasing in M and decreasing in X.
Intuitively, higher rents imply higher taris, since t = R
y(e). This solely
benets the voters with stakes in the import-competing industry by raising
the return to the specic factor used in this sector, while the welfare cost
of higher rents is borne by both types of factor owners. Hence, when the
number of swing voters increases within the group of owners of the specic
factor used by industry M (X), the optimal rents increase (decrease).
Using (3.25) and (3.26) in the derivative of (3.10) with respect to RA,
substituting the resulting expression in (3.27), solving for the equilibrium
rents under the majoritarian electoral rule to obtain:
21R











j6=Z jj. ~ RMAJ is decreasing in  , and it is straightforward
to verify that (3.31) is increasing in M and decreasing in X. The intuition
is the same as under proportional elections.
Assuming that y( ~ RPRO) = y( ~ RMAJ) = y( ~ R) and y(ePRO) = y(eMAJ) =
y(e),25 subtracting (3.31) from (3.29) gives:
~ R
PRO   ~ R
MAJ =





 > 0 if ~ RPRO  0 and ~ RMAJ  0 or ~ RPRO  0 and ~ RMAJ  0.26
~ RPRO > ~ RMAJ ( ~ RPRO < ~ RMAJ) if there are relatively more factor own-
ers in district Z with stakes in the exporting (import-competing) industry.
When X > M (X < M), the parties gain by announcing relatively lower
(higher) rents under majoritarian representation. Lower (higher) rents trans-
late into a less (more) protectionist trade policy, which is preferred by the
voter group that owns the factor used in the exporting (import-competing)
sector. The stier majoritarian electoral competition makes it politically op-
timal to propose a policy closer to the bliss point of the decisive fraction of
the voters in the marginal district, X (M); that is, less (more) political
rents. Hence, in contrast to the result of Persson and Tabellini (1999), more
rents do not necessarily make the candidates lose votes at a higher rate un-
der majoritarian elections. As shown here, the relative level of rent seeking
depends on the relative number of voters in the swing districts who own the
factor specic to the exporting industry.
25It can be shown that y( ~ RPRO) = y( ~ RMAJ) is satised for linear and convex import-
competing supply functions with dierent slope coecients, while y(ePRO) = y(eMAJ)


















 > 0 if the denominator of (3.29) and (3.31) is simultaneously non-negative or
non-positive, i.e., if ~ RPRO  0 and ~ RMAJ  0 or ~ RPRO  0 and ~ RMAJ  0.
224 Conclusions
Recent research has found somewhat ambiguous evidence about the relation-
ship between the relative level of trade protection in a country and the type
of electoral rule employed. This paper suggests a possible solution to the
indeterminacy by explicitly incorporating an export industry, producing for
foreign markets using a sector-specic factor, into a model of endogenous
trade policy with probabilistic voting. On the basis of this framework, it is
shown that trade policy is more (less) restrictive under proportional electoral
regimes, as compared to majoritarian institutions, if swing districts are pop-
ulated by relatively more (less) factor owners with stakes in the exporting
sector. The reason is that the election outcome under a majoritarian sys-
tem is more sensitive to policy. Therefore, the dominant, or decisive, type
of input owners in the marginal districts obtains a trade policy closer to its
optimum, in relation to proportional representation, which translates into a
relatively less (more) protectionist policy stance in equilibrium.
The paper also provides some insights into rent seeking in a small open
economy from a comparative political economy perspective. Persson and
Tabellini (1999) show that because of the more intense political competition
under the majoritarian regime, parties become more disciplined and forego
some prospective rents. This is, however, not consistent with the observation
that countries that apply the majoritarian system rate as less democratic,
where rent seeking is high. The argument provided in this paper is that
politicians optimally apply a lower (higher) level of rent seeking under the
majoritarian electoral rule if and only if there are relatively more factor
owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import-competing)
sector.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Determining the Sign of (3.14)
Consider the case where tPRO > 0 and tMAJ > 0, such that PRO > 0 and




inequality tPRO > tMAJ implies that
y(tMAJ)
y(tPRO) < 1, since the supply curve
of the import-competing commodity is upward-sloping. PRO   MAJ =
3(X M)MX
(1+M)(MM+XX)(M(1+M)+X(1+X)). Hence, PRO
MAJ > 1 >
y(tMAJ)
y(tPRO) if and
only if X > M. Thus, tPRO > tMAJ if and only if X > M. By the same
argument, tPRO < tMAJ if and only if X < M.
If, on the other hand, tPRO < 0 and tMAJ < 0, such that PRO < 0 and






when tPRO > tMAJ. In this case, a necessary, but not sucient, condition
for tPRO > tMAJ to be satised is given by: PRO   MAJ > 0, which is true
if and only if X > M. Using the same line of reasoning, it follows that
the necessary, but not sucient, condition for tPRO < tMAJ to hold is that
X < M.
Moreover, it should be noted that tPRO = tMAJ if X = M.
A.2 Determining the Sign of (3.15)
Assume that ePRO > 0 and eMAJ > 0, such that PRO > 0 and MAJ > 0.
From (3.15) it is clear that ePRO > eMAJ if PRO
MAJ >
y(eMAJ)
y(ePRO) . ePRO >
eMAJ implies that
y(eMAJ)
y(ePRO) < 1, since the supply curve of domestic exports




MAJ > 1 >
y(eMAJ)
y(ePRO) if and only if M > X. Consequently,
ePRO > eMAJ if and only if M > X. Using the same argument, ePRO <
eMAJ if and only if M < X.
If ePRO < 0 and eMAJ < 0, such that PRO < 0 and MAJ < 0, then





y(ePRO) < 1 when ePRO > eMAJ. Hence,
a necessary, but not sucient, condition for ePRO > eMAJ to be satised is
given by: PRO   MAJ > 0. This holds if and only if M > X. It follows
26that the necessary, but not sucient, condition for ePRO < eMAJ to hold is
that M < X.
ePRO = eMAJ if M = X.






(1 + X)(M   X)















(MM(1 + X)   XX(1 + M))
































 0 must hold.





(1 + M)(X   M)













(XX(1 + M)   MM(1 + X))




























   
M=X
 0 is satised.
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